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1  Introduction 
Many agricultural industries have utilized industry-wide promotion programs funded by 
producer and/or handler assessments as a tool to increase sales and producer incomes. 
Mandated commodity promotion programs are not only an important economic issue, but 
also a subject of dispute and litigation. Various studies have shown that these programs 
are often quite successful in generating a high return on the dollars invested (Kaiser et al. 
2005). However, most of these studies have been conducted using aggregate time-series 
data, making it is difficult to identify the promotional effects precisely when many factors 
that can affect demand are changing together. Moreover, the evaluation at the industry 
level can provide little guidance in terms of targeting advertising to cities or retailers and 
determining which types of campaigns are most effective.  This study evaluates industry-
funded  promotion  programs  for  avocados,  an  important  specialty  commodity  in 
California. We use a unique micro dataset that surmounts many of the problems incurred 
when working with aggregate data. 
Promotions  are  a  prospectively  important  tool  to  help  the  California  avocado 
industry remain competitive in the face of increasing import competition. The industry 
has  expended  over  $10  million  annually  for  its  marketing  programs  in  recent  years 
conducted  through  the  auspices  of  the  California  Avocado  Commission  (CAC).  In 
particular, the objectives of this study include (i) measuring the effects of the CAC’s 
promotion  programs  by  utilizing  natural  experiment  design,  panel  models,  and 
econometric techniques that isolate unobserved factors that may contribute to changes in 
demand,  (ii)  analyzing  differential  demand  response  to  different  types  of  advertising 
programs and cross different city markets, and (iii) developing a framework to estimate   2 
benefit-cost ratios at the city market level and discerning the benefit-cost ratios from the 
level of retail chain back to the farm gate. The evaluation for avocado promotion is also 
conducted  by  using  aggregate  time-series  data  and  a  typical  benefit-cost  analysis 
extended from Carman and Craft (1998). The results from both sets of evaluation are 
compared for discussions on what we have learned from use of novel data and models.  
Mandated promotion programs will continue to be important and controversial. 
As  retailer  scanner  data  and  other  micro  level  data  become  increasingly  available  to 
researchers,  this  study  opens  discussion  on  new  methodologies  and  more  advanced 
models  for  promotion  evaluation  by  utilizing  novel  data.  Moreover,  evaluating  the 
effectiveness  of  the  avocado  industry’s  promotion  programs  will  shed  light  on  what 
strategies  the  California  industry  can  undertake  to  remain  competitive  in  face  of 
increasing competition from imports. Although this study has a particular application for 
avocados,  the  results  achieved  and  the  methodologies  developed  will  have  broad 
implications for other agricultural industries and promotion programs. 
2  California Avocado Industry and Its Promotion Programs 
California  avocados,  with  average  annual  sales  of  $346  million  from  2001  to  2003, 
ranked fourth in farm value of production among California fruit crops (following grapes, 
strawberries, and oranges) and 16
th among all California crop and livestock commodities 
(California Agricultural Statistics, 2003). California produces 90 percent of the annual 
U.S. avocado crop, with Florida accounting for the remainder (Noncitrus Fruits and Nuts 
Summary, 1997-2004).
1 
                                                 
1 Hawaii accounts for less than 0.5 percent of the U.S avocado annual production.    3 
This  study  focuses  on  the  Hass  avocado  variety,  which  is  only  produced  in 
California  in  the  U.S.  The  Hass  variety  accounts  for  about  92  percent  of  California 
avocado  production  and  97  percent  of  sales  revenue  for  the  five  varieties  with 
commercial production since 2001. Although produced throughout the year, production 
of  California  Hass  avocados  tends  to  be  seasonal,  with  very  low  production  during 
November and December, increasing to May and remaining high through September, and 
then decreasing through the end of October (see Figure 1). 
Due to the seasonal pattern of California avocado production, avocado supply in 
the U.S. is supplemented by imports. The Hass variety has comprised 90 percent of total 
U.S.  avocado  imports  since  2001.  Chile  is  the  largest  avocado  exporter  to  the  U.S., 
followed by Mexico. The two countries account for over 90 percent of total avocado 
imports and virtually all of the Hass imports. As shown in Figure 1, avocado imports to 
the U.S. reveal a  clear  seasonal pattern that is  counter to the seasonal  pattern of the 
California  avocado  production.  Imports  of  Chilean  Hass  avocados  (CHA)  occur 
throughout the year. CHA imports typically begin to increase in August, with the highest 
volumes  occurring  during  September  through  December,  and  then  decrease  through 
March and remain very low until August. 
Trade barriers for Hass avocados from Mexico have been in place due to stated 
concerns about invasive pests and diseases. There has been a progressive elimination of 
import restrictions on MHA since 1997. Avocado imports increased dramatically after the 
fourth quarter in 1998, while the domestic production fluctuated during this period (see 
Figure 1). The average annual growth rates were 35 percent for total avocado imports, 37 
percent for Chilean avocado imports, and 55 percent for Mexican avocado imports during   4 
1997—2004.  The  share  of  Chilean  avocado  imports  remained  stable,  66  percent  on 
average  during  1996—2004.  The  share  of  avocado  imports  emanating  from  Mexico 
increased from 7 percent in 1996 to 27 percent in 2004 accompanied by decreases in 
imports  from  other  exporters,  such  as  the  Dominican  Republic.  Meanwhile  avocado 
consumption  has  increased  steadily  during  the  same  period,  with  an  average  annual 
growth rate of 10 percent. The share of domestic consumption supplied by California 
declined from 82 percent in 1996 to 55 percent in 2004. 
Promotions  are  a  prospectively  important  tool  to  help  the  California  avocado 
industry remain competitive in the face of increasing import competition. The industry 
expended $10 million annually during 2002—2004 on its combined marketing programs 
conducted through the auspices of the California Avocado Commission (CAC). Specific 
marketing  efforts  have  taken  a  variety  of  forms,  including  consumer  advertising, 
merchandising,  promotions  directed  to  food  service,  and  public  relations.  Consumer 
advertising received the greatest percentage of marketing program funds, averaging 50 
percent of total marketing program expenditure during this period. 
The  CAC’s  advertising  programs  are  conducted  in  eleven  or  twelve  selected 
markets each year.
2 The selected markets for the CAC’s promotions are those that did not 
have access to MHA imports. Further the promotion programs were conducted between 
March and August when MHA imports were not allowed and CHA imports were low. 
Therefore, the advertising programs are expected to have few spill-over effects that cause 
expansion in avocado imports.  
                                                 
2 The selected markets for the CAC’s promotion programs are Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, 
Sacramento, Phoenix, Dallas, San Antonio, Houston, Denver, Portland, Seattle, and Atlanta.  The CAC 
stopped its promotions in Denver after 2002, and began its promotions in Phoenix and Seattle in 2001.    5 
The promotion programs are broken down into three categories by media type: 
radio  advertising,  outdoor  displays,  and  magazine  advertising.
3  Radio  advertising 
received  on  average  61  percent  of  all  advertising  dollars  during  2002—2004.  Radio 
promotions are conducted four times for three-week periods between February and mid-
July  each  year.  Outdoor  promotions  are  held  during  the  intervals  between  radio 
promotions in all the selected markets except Atlanta, and involve displays of billboards 
and posters. Outdoor displays accounted for 21 percent of the advertising expenditure for 
the  same  period.  Magazine  advertising  has  taken  place  only  in  Atlanta,  which  is 
considered  as  a  developing  market  by  the  CAC.  Information  cards  and/or  flyers  are 
placed in some issues of some magazines sold in Atlanta. 
3  Analytical Model for Promotion Evaluation 
The impact of advertising programs on demand at the retail level is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Several  economic  bases  and  empirical  evidence  support  the  hypothesis  that  grocery 
retailers are likely to posses some degree of market power in selling into consumers. In 
practice, large retail chains make pricing decisions collectively. Hence, we assume retail 
chains  face  a  downward-sloping  demand  for  avocados,  which  is  d0  in  absence  of 
advertising programs. If advertising programs are successful in promoting demand at the 
retail level, the demand curve shifts to the right to d1. Retail chains’ supply for avocados 
is represented as s. The quantity and price of avocados in the initial equilibrium without 
promotions are q0 and p0.  
Because  avocado  is  a  perennial  crop,  the  short-run  supply  is  expected  to  be 
perfectly inelastic. Shipments need to be relocated between markets where promotions 
                                                 
3 Eighty-five percent of consumer advertising funds were spent on radio advertising, outdoor displays, and 
magazine advertising during 2002—2004. The rest were used to cover administration costs (8.6%), and 
were spent on other programs (6.4%), such as coupon program.    6 
are  conducted  and  markets  where  promotions  are  not  implemented,  in  order  to 
accommodate  increases  in  demand  in  promotion  markets.  Figure  3  illustrates  the 
arbitrage  of  avocado  shipments  between  markets  with  promotions  and  without 
promotions, given that a demand shift is generated in promotion markets. The shipping 
price in promotion markets increases as a result of demand shift, and the shipping price in 
markets  without  promotions  rises  due  to  the  decrease  in  shipment.  Shipments  to 
promotion  markets  continue  to  increase  until  shipping  prices  in  both  markets  with 
promotions  and  without  promotions  equal  to  each  other.  All  in  all,  shipping  price 
increases as a result of the demand shift generated by industry promotion programs. 
Increase in the shipping price raises retailers’ purchasing price for avocados. If 
retail price for avocados increases only in an amount of the increase in the shipping price, 
retail margin maintains unchanged. Consequently, the demand shifts to the right to q1 and 
price increases to p1.  
Warner and Barsky (1995) and Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) showed that 
retail prices revealed countercyclical movements over demand cycles for many consumer 
products  and  supermarket  commodities,  respectively.  Li,  Carman,  and  Sexton  (2005) 
found  that  retail  prices  and  margins  are  significantly  lower  during  demand  peaks  for 
avocados. Both Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) and Li, Carman, and Sexton (2005) 
support  the  hypothesis  of  Lal  and  Matutes’  (1994)  model.  Lal  and  Matutes  (1994) 
developed a model to explore retailers’ pricing and advertising activities. In their model, 
retailers  compete  with  each  other  conducting  advertised  sales  in  order  to  attract 
consumers into the store and earn profit from other goods that consumers buy if they visit 
the store. The implication of their model is that retailers are more likely to put products   7 
with  high  demand  on  sale.  If  retailers  choose  to  lower  retail  margins  in  response  to 
industry  promotions  either  by  lowering  retail  price  or  by  maintaining  retail  price 
unchanged given the shipping price for avocados has increased, we expect demand for 
avocados at the retail level expands further to q2 or q3.  
On the other hand, evidence of higher retail markup, i.e., by which retail price is 
higher  than  p1,  in  response  to  the  CAC  promotions  supports  a  simple  market  power 
model of retail pricing, whereby retailers increase prices and margins to capture benefits 
from the demand expansion. Notably the behavior described in Lal and Matutes’ model 
reinforces  the  effect  of  the  CAC  promotions,  while  behavior  describe  by  the  simple 
market power model mitigates their effectiveness. 
The effects of promotion programs at the farm level are illustrated in Figure 4. 
Because avocado is a perennial crop, plantation decisions are predetermined. Therefore, 
the avocado supply (S) is fixed at Q0. Demand for avocado at the aggregate level is 
represented as D0. P0 is the price for avocados at the farm level in the initial equilibrium 
without promotions. If industry promotions are successful in increase demand, demand 
curve shifts from D0 to D1. Farm price increases from P0 to P1 as the result of the positive 
demand shifts generated by promotions. The increase in farm price equals to the increase 
in shipping prices shown in Figure 3, because growers/shippers are integrated in avocado 
market.  
The benefit of promotions can be represented as the rectangular area P0P1E1E0. 
There are two ways to estimate the benefit: We can obtain the changes in farm-level price 
by estimating an inverse demand model at the farm gate and calculate the benefit of 
promotions given a fixed production volume. The other way is to estimate demand shifts   8 
at the retail market and derive changes in farm-level price from the demand shift. If the 
demand  shift,  Q0Q1  in  Figure  4,  can  be  measured  and  the  slope  coefficient  of  the 
aggregate demand curve can be estimated, the change in farm-level price can be derived. 
A new framework for promotion evaluation is developed in this paper to measure 
the benefit of promotions at the retail and city market level and retrieve the benefit from 
the city market level back to the farm gate. First we describe the framework in the case 
that the data on promotion expenditures are only available at the aggregate level, e.g., the 
total amount that the CAC spent on promotion programs in 2003. The discussion on the 
disaggregated measurements for promotion benefits and benefit-cost ratios follows.  
In the first step, we estimate a demand model for avocados at the retail level, 
where  promotion  is  captured  as  a  demand  shift  factor  in  the  model.  Therefore,  the 
demand shift in each promotion market can be estimated. Then, demand expansions due 
to promotions in all promotion markets are aggregated. Third, we estimate an inverse 
demand model at the farm gate to obtain the slope coefficient.  
Fourth, based on the estimated slope coefficient of the inverse demand model and 
the estimated demand shift, we simulate the effects of demand expansion on farm-gate 
price. Notice that not only can we obtain the change in farm price due to the total demand 
shift,  but  also  we  can  simulate  the  changes  in  farm  price  due  to  demand  shift  in  a 
particular market. Fifth, the benefit of promotion as the rectangular area, P0P1E1E0 in 
Figure 4, is calculated. Finally, the average benefit-cost ratios can be obtained based on 
the information on promotion expenditure. 
More  valuable  analysis  on  the  effectiveness  of  promotion  programs  can  be 
achieved, if the data on promotion expenditure are available at the city market level,   9 
and/or by promotion types (e.g. radio or outdoor promotions), and/or in specific time 
periods. Both average and marginal benefit-cost ratios can be estimated at the market 
level, by promotion types, and by the times of promotions. For example, the increase in 
farm-gate price due to demand shifts generated by radio promotions in Los Angeles can 
be  estimated  and  the  corresponding  marginal  and  average  benefit-cost  ratios  can  be 
calculated. 
Various studies estimated demand expansion and benefits of industry promotion 
programs by utilizing time series data at the aggregate level. The only prior evaluation of 
avocado industry advertising programs is the work of Carman and Craft (1998), who 
analyze the CAC’s promotion programs using aggregate annual data from 1961-95. The 
changes in farm-gate price are obtained by estimating an inverse demand model at the 
farm gate that incorporates industry promotion as a demand shift factor. The benefit is 
calculated based on the estimated price change and the production volume. The study 
indicates that avocado advertising was effective on balance, yielding an average return of 
$7 per $1 expended on advertising. However, it does not provide evidence on demand 
responses to different promotion activities at the disaggregated level. In addition, little is 
known about how retailers’ pricing strategies interact with and modify the effectiveness 
of  this  and  other  industry  promotion  programs.  The  data  set  available  for  this  study 
provides us an unprecedented opportunity to assess these issues. 
The  framework  developed  by  this  paper  has  the  following  advantages:  i)  a 
“cleaner” identification of promotional effects can be achieved by a natural experiment 
design and by utilizing retail and city market level data, so that unobserved factors that 
may  contribute  to  changes  in  demand  are  isolated;  ii)  different  types  of  advertising   10 
programs, across different city markets, and during different times of the year can be 
evaluated;  iii)  the  role  of  retailer  pricing  strategies  in  industry  promotions  can  be 
analyzed.  
4  The Data 
We were able to assemble a unique and comprehensive data set through the cooperation 
of  the  CAC  and  its  marketing  agent—Fusion  Marketing.  The  specific  data  sources 
include weekly retailer scanner data provided by Information Resources Inc. (IRI) for 82 
major  U.S.  retail  accounts  across  38  markets  for  avocados  from  November  2001  to 
October 2004. A “retail account” refers to a particular market-retail chain combination, 
e.g., Retailer 1 in Chicago. There are 46 retail chains in the data. We are not able to 
reveal the names of retail chains due to the agreement with IRI. The weekly data include 
volume and dollar sales, and retail prices. We focus on large and small sizes of Hass 
avocados, which were carried by most of the retail accounts and accounted for over 90 
percent of the total category sales. Marketing year for avocados instead of calendar year 
is used in our analysis. A marketing year runs from Mid-October through Mid-October in 
the following calendar year. 
Second, the CAC provided weekly shipment data, including shipping-point prices 
and shipment volumes of Hass avocados from California to each of the 38 destination 
markets  during  the  study  period.  The  weekly  shipping-point  prices  are  the  average 
weekly  prices  charged  by  shippers  for  shipments  to  each  of  the  destination  markets. 
These prices exceed the farm-gate prices by amounts that reflect shippers’ inventory and 
transactions costs and provide a better reflection of what retailers in each destination 
market  actually  paid  than  do  the  farm-gate  prices.  Third,  the  commission  publishes   11 
monthly  farm  prices  and  volumes  for  varieties  of  Californian  avocados.  Fourth,  we 
obtained data on monthly volumes and values of total Hass imports to the U.S., and the 
Hass imports from Chile and Mexico to the U.S. from the United States International 
Trade Commission (USITC).  
Finally, we were provided access to information on the media types, geographic 
locations, and the timing of the advertising programs conducted by the CAC during the 
study period. For example, a radio promotion was conducted in all promotion market in 
the first three weeks of March 2003, and a print promotion was conducted in Atlanta in 
May 2003. Further, the data on the annual expenditure for each type of promotions is 
utilized when we conducted this analysis.  
5  Empirical Methodology—the Approach of “Difference-in-Difference” 
The approach of Difference in Difference (DID) is employed to evaluate the promotional 
effects of the CAC’s advertising programs on retail sales, and to examine how retailers 
set prices in response to the CAC’s promotions. The DID approach has been applied 
broadly in studies on program and policy evaluations, such as Card’s (1990) assessment 
of the effects of immigration on native wages and employment and Angrist and Levy’s 
(1999) analysis of the effect of class size on student test scores. Despite substantial prior 
research on evaluation of promotion programs, few have utilized the DID approach. To 
our  knowledge,  the  only  study  is  Busse,  Silva-Risso,  and  Zettelmeyer  (2004),  who 
analyze the effects of asymmetry information in the bargaining process on transaction 
prices under cash rebate promotions in the car industry. 
We discuss the DID approach in the context of evaluating the effect of the CAC’s 
promotion programs on retail sales following Ashenfelter and Card (1985), who evaluate   12 
the effect of job training on earnings. The DID approach is also applied to evaluate other 
outcome measures, such as retail prices and margins. The empirical models for each of 
the outcomes are presented in the next section.  
The  fact  that  the  CAC  selected  a  set  of  markets  for  its  promotion  programs 
enables us to construct both treatment and control groups for the program evaluation. The 
DID  approach  estimates  the  counterfactual  outcomes  for  the  retail  accounts  in  the 
selected markets that received the CAC’s promotion programs. The DID framework for 
identifying  the  “treatment  effects”  of  the  CAC’s  promotions  on  retail  sales  can  be 
presented by the following linear model: 
 (1)                  ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( t a t a p t a D a t t a q ν β ψ η δ + + + + = , 
where q(a,t) denotes retail sales (or demand) for avocados at retail account a and time t. 
Let the pre-treatment period, t = 0, be the period when there was no promotion, and let 
the post-treatment period, t = 1, be the period when the CAC conducted its promotions. 
D(a,t)  denotes whether a retail account was exposed to the CAC’s promotions or not. 
p(a,t) denotes the retail price of avocados sold by retail account a at time t. Suppose that 
only q(a,t), D(a,t) and p(a,t) are observed. We refer retail accounts that were exposed to 
the CAC’s promotion programs (i.e., D(a,1) = 1) as the “treated”, and those that were not 
exposed to the promotions (i.e., D(a,1) = 0) as the “controls”. D(a,0) equals zero for both 
the  treated  and  controls,  because  there  was  no  promotion  at  t  =  0.  ψ  represents  the 
“treatment  effects”  of  the  CAC’s  promotion  programs.  δ(t)  denotes  the  time-specific 
component,  η(a)  represents  the  account-specific  effects,  and  ν(a,t)  is  the  individual 
transitory error term with zero mean at both t = 0 and t = 1. The advantage of the panel   13 
data utilized in this study enables us to control idiosyncratic characteristics of individual 
retailers or markets by fixed effects. 
The  CAC  did  not  select  markets  for  its  promotion  programs  randomly.  The 
selected markets are among the top fifteen markets that have the largest market shares of 
avocado sales in the U.S., and did not allow MHA imports during the study period.
 4 A 
concern  usually  arises  about  selection  bias.  That  is, selection  for  promotions  may  be 
correlated with the individual transitory error term. However, the set of markets selected 
by the CAC for promotion has been quite stable since 1997. We believe that market 
selection for the CAC’s promotions is affected by market-specific characteristics that do 
not change during the study period, and, therefore, can be controlled by fixed effects.  
Under the assumption that selection for treatment is not correlated with the error 
term, we can obtain the difference in the expected retail sales with and without the CAC’s 
promotions for the retail accounts in the treated and control markets as 
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4 An exception is Denver, where the CAC continued promoting avocados in 2002 after MHA imports were 
allowed to enter Colorado in November 2001, but the CAC discontinued its promotion programs in Denver 
after 2002.     14 
Notice  that  the  use  of  a  simple  comparison  of  retail  sales  before  and  after 
promotions to evaluate the promotional effects is likely to be biased by temporal trends in 
retail sales or by factors other than the promotions that occurred during both periods. The 
DID  approach  is  applied  to  construct  a  counterfactual  against  which  to  measure  the 
promotional effects. Therefore, the “treatment effects” of the CAC’s promotions can be 
identified in the following form: 
{ }
{ }
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The effects of promotion programs can be decomposed into two parts. One is 
represented ψ by that is the demand shift generated by promotions and is presented as 
q0q1 in Figure 2. The other is the changes in demand due to changes in retail price as the 
result that retailers adjust retail prices for avocados in response to industry promotions. 
We now turn to discuss the effects of promotion programs on retail prices. 
The DID estimator requires a strong assumption that the average outcomes for the 
treated and controls would have followed parallel paths over time in the absence of the 
treatment.  However,  a  complication  arises  in  our  application  because  shipping-point 
prices for avocados differ somewhat across market destinations, as table 1 documents. 
Further, it is possible that shipping-point prices moved differently in promotion market 
from those in the markets without promotions. If retail prices at the stores in the treated 
markets were higher than retail prices at the stores in the control markets, it could be the 
result of the higher shipping-point prices in the treated markets relative to the control 
markets.  Therefore,  we  incorporate  the  contemporaneous  and  lagged  market-specific   15 
shipping-point prices as explanatory variables to control for the difference in shipping-
point prices between the treated and control markets.  
The  other  complication  is  that  different  markets  might  have  different  supply 
sources of Hass avocados other than California. Each of the markets selected for the 
CAC’s advertising programs is in a state that did not allow MHA imports during the 
study period.  However, many markets in the control group in our data had access to 
MHA  imports.  The  markets  that  allowed  MHA  imports  likely  had  lower  avocado 
acquisition costs during the months that MHA were available.
 5 Therefore, retail prices in 
the treated markets could be higher than retail prices in the control markets during some 
periods of the CAC’s promotions because of relatively higher avocado acquisition costs 
in the treated markets. However, this problem is less worrisome, because only at the 
beginning of the promotion period, i.e. in March, MHA imports were allowed.  
We tackle this problem in two ways. First, we construct two different control 
groups. One control group includes markets that did not have access to MHA imports, 
and the other includes both markets that allowed and did not allow MHA imports. Second, 
we incorporate import volumes of MHA into the model when the control group includes 
both markets with and without access to MHA imports.  
The DID model for retail prices takes the following form that incorporates the 
shipping-point prices of California avocados and the Hass avocado imports from Mexico 
and Chile as covariates: 
                                                 
5 To get a sense of the price difference between domestic and imported avocados, we calculated the per lb. 
costs of avocados imported from Chile and Mexico as the landed duty-paid values of the imports divided 
by import volumes. This measure includes essentially all costs incurred in getting the imported product 
across the border and is comparable to a per lb. shipping-point price from California.  The following are the 
summary statistics for mean price/lb. over our November 2001—October 2004 sample period:  Mexican 
imports—$1.0061 (s.d. = 0.065), Chilean imports—$1.0781 (s.d. = 0.0210), California—$1.1668 (s.d. = 
0.2453).  Thus, Mexican (Chilean) imported avocados were about $0.17/lb. ($0.09/lb.) cheaper on average 
relative to California avocados.   16 
(2)  ) , ( ) ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( t a t fimpCH t a eimpMH t a dw t a cD a b t a t a p ζ + + + + + + = , 
where w(a,t) denotes the California shipping-point price at time t in the market where the 
retail account a is located; impMH(a,t) represents MHA import volumes that are relevant 
to retail accounts in the states that allowed MHA imports at time t; and impCH(t) are 
import volumes of CHA at time t that are common to all the markets. In this generalized 
model, c is no longer the only term that accounts for the difference in the expected retail 
prices with and without promotions, and between accounts in the selected markets and 
control markets. However, c can still be identified as the “treatment effect” of the CAC’s 
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If c is zero, we expect that retailers only adjust retail prices in response to changes in 
shipping-point price or prices for imported avocados due to promotional activities.  
We return to the discussion on the promotional effects on retail sales. If retail 
margins do not change in response to industry promotion programs, we expect that ψ 
represents the demand expansion generated by promotion programs at the retail level. 
Otherwise, the total demand expansion at the retail level is the sum of demand shift 
generated by promotions and the demand increase due to retailers’ pricing strategies. 
The  above  framework  is  applied  to  evaluate  three  types  of  the  CAC’s 
promotions—radio,  outdoor,  and  magazine  advertising  programs.  However,  the 
promotional effects of magazine advertisements might not be clearly identified. The DID 
approach requires unambiguous recognition of the periods with and without promotions.   17 
However,  the  timing  that  people  are  exposed  to  magazine  advertisements  is  highly 
uncertain. For example, people could purchase an issue of a monthly magazine at any 
time of the month, and read it at any time after that month.  In any event, magazine 
advertisements are of minor importance to our analysis, given that they were conducted 
only in Atlanta. 
In contrast, the promotional effects of both radio and outdoor programs can be 
identified under the DID framework. People could either be exposed to an advertisement 
directly at the same time, or obtain the information about the advertisement indirectly 
through other people. Since each radio or outdoor promotion lasted a fair amount of time, 
three  or  four  weeks  respectively,  we  expect  that  both  radio  and  outdoor  advertising 
programs generated promotional effects, if any, mostly during the promotion periods. A 
concern still rises about identifying possibly lagged effects of both radio and outdoor 
promotions. Because radio and outdoor promotions followed each other consecutively, 
the promotional coefficient of radio advertising could also pick up the lagged effects of 
the preceding outdoor promotions, and vice versa.  The data give us no good way to 
discriminate between these possibilities, but, notably, if the primary focus is the overall 
effectiveness of the CAC’s synchronized radio-and-outdoor-media campaign, separating 
the impacts of the individual components is unimportant. 
6  The Empirical Model 
We evaluate the effects of the CAC’s promotion programs on both retail sales and retail 
pricing. In particular, three empirical models are estimated: a retail sales model, a model 
of retail prices, and a model of retail margins. In the following, we present empirical   18 
models for retail sales and retailer pricing behavior along with discussions on variable 
selection, estimation methods, and hypothesis tests. 
A retail sales model 
A retail sales response model is estimated to examine the effectiveness of the CAC’s 
advertising programs in terms of promoting demand at the retail level. The retail sales 
model is specified in the following form: 
(1) 
t s a
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where qa,s,t is the sales volume for size s avocados at retail account a in week t in 1000 
units.  t s a p , , ˆ  and  1 , , ˆ − t s a p  are the predicted retail prices for size s at account a in week t and 
t-1 obtained from the estimation of the retail pricing model that will be discussed in the 
following. Due to the likely endogeneity between the retail prices and the error term in 
the sales response model, we include the predicted retail prices instead of the actual retail 
prices.  
γ is the constant term. γ t represents time-related control variables, which account 
for demand variation over (i) marketing years, (ii) months, and (iii) holidays or special 
events. A marketing year runs from Mid-October to Mid-October the next calendar year. 
Fixed effects, γ a,s, are utilized for particular account-size combinations to control for 
different seasonal demand patterns across different retail accounts. 
The  set  of  terms  in  the  second  brackets  measure  the  impacts  of  the  CAC’s 
promotion  programs.  Radiom,t,  Outdoorm,t,  and  Magazinem,t  are  the  “treatment  on  the 
treated” variables, which are set equal to one if the CAC was running a radio, outdoor, or   19 
magazine promotion program in market m in week t. τ1, τ 2, and τ 3 are the coefficients to 
be  estimated  that  represent  the  “treatment  effects”  of  the  CAC’s  radio,  outdoor  and 
magazine advertising programs on retail sales, respectively. 
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The  error  term  is  assumed  to  have  a  normal  distribution  with  zero  mean  and 
heteroskedastic variances for each of the account-size combinations. Second, the errors 
are assumed to be contemporaneously correlated between any account-size combinations. 
Furthermore, the error term is also assumed to follow an AR(1) process, and different 
autocorrelation parameters are allowed for different account-size combinations.  , , a s t ν is 
white  noise.  The  model  is  estimated  by  the  Prais-Winsten  method,  which  utilizes  a 
feasible generalized least squares estimation procedure conditioning on the assumed error 
structure. 
The model is estimated by a two-stage least squares procedure. At the first stage, 
the retail pricing model is estimated by the Prais-Winsten method, and the predicted retail 
prices are obtained. At the second stage, the retail sales model is estimated by the Prais-
Winsten procedure by incorporating the predicted retail prices from the first stage.   20 
A Retail Pricing Model 
A retail pricing model is applied to capture retail price movements in response to changes 
in cost and demand factors. Based upon equation (2), the retail pricing model is specified 
in the following form: 
(2) 
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where pa,s,t is the retail price measured by $/unit at retail account a for size s (s = {large, 
small}) in week t. The time-related control variables, fixed effects, and the variables for 
the CAC’s promotion programs have the same interpretations as those included in the 
retail sales model. Fixed effects, αa,s, are utilized for particular account-size combinations 
to  control  for  heterogeneity  in  retailer  pricing  behavior.  ψ1,  ψ2,  and  ψ3  are  the 
coefficients to be estimated that represent the “treatment effects” of the CAC’s radio, 
outdoor and magazine advertising programs on retail prices, respectively. 
wm,s,t  and  wm,s,t-1  in  the  second  set  of  brackets  are  the  shipping-point  prices 
measured by $/unit for size s avocados shipped from California to market m in week t and 
t-1.  The  shipping-point  price  and  its  one-week  lag  account  for  the  impact  of 
contemporaneous and lagged cost-side shocks on retailers’ prices.  A two-week period 
should represent a sufficient time period for changes in the shipping-point price for this 
highly perishable commodity to reflect fully in retailers’ acquisition costs (see footnote 8).   
The third and fourth sets of brackets contain terms for MHA and CHA imports, 
respectively. Seasont captures the common seasonal shocks for all the markets during the   21 
period when MHA imports were available, and it is set equal to one if MHA imports 
were  allowed  in  week  t.  The  variables  impMHm,t  and  impMHm,t-1  are  MHA  import 
volumes in 1,000,000 pounds in the current month and previous month, respectively. The 
import volumes of MHA are the total MHA imports to the U.S., but not market specific. 
The subscript m only indicates whether import volumes of MHA are relevant to market m 
that allowed MHA imports in week t. impMHm,t and impMHm,t-1, therefore, represent the 
“treatment  on  the  treated”.  The  variables  impCHt,  and  impCHt-1  in  the  fourth  set  of 
brackets have the same interpretation but apply to import volumes of CHA, which are 
relevant to all markets. All the import volumes are on a monthly basis. They represent the 
import volumes of MHA or CHA available in the month in which week t is located. 
Because the storage life expectancy is less than two weeks (see footnote 8), the lagged 
import  volumes  were  constructed  so  that  import  volumes  in  the  last  month  are  only 
relevant to the time prior to the middle of the current month. 
The error term, ea,s,t, is assumed to have the same structure as the error term in the 
retail pricing model. 
A model of the farm-retail price spreads 
The retail pricing model, however, cannot directly reflect how retail markups change over 
demand shocks. Therefore, we construct the farm-retail price spread as an approximation 
to the retail margin, and estimate a model of the farm-retail price spread. The dependent 
variable is the farm-retail price spread in $/unit for size s avocados at account a in week t. 
It is computed as the difference between retail price for size s avocados at retail account a 
in week t and the shipping-point price for size s avocados shipped from California to 
market m in week t.    22 
There  were  cases  when  California  Hass  avocados  were  not  shipped  to  some 
market during some period. If a market was not supplied by California for one or two 
weeks, we use the average of shipping-point prices of the preceding and following weeks 
when the shipping-point prices were available. If a market was not supplied by California 
for more than two weeks, we use shipping-point prices in a market located closest or the 
average  of  shipping-point  prices  in  several  markets  located  close.  In  either  case,  the 
proxy shipping-point price is the shadow price of California Hass avocados that retailers 
in the market utilized to make their procurement decisions.  
The  model  includes  all  explanatory  variables  in  the  retail  pricing  model  with 
exclusion  of  shipping-point  prices.  Furthermore,  we  include  shipment  volumes  as  an 
explanatory variable, which are shipments in 1,000,000 units for size s avocados shipped 
from  California  to  market  m  in  week  t.  The  variable  is  included  to  indicate  whether 
retailers are able to bid down shipping-point prices for avocados as a consequence of 
large shipments.
6 The model is assumed to have the same model and error structure as the 
retail pricing model. It is also estimated by the Prais-Winsten method. 
Consider now the expected effects of the CAC’s promotions on retail sales, retail 
prices and markups. If the promotions are successful, retail sales should rise, whereas 
unsuccessful promotions will have little impact on sales. A priori expectations for the 
impact of promotions on retail prices are less clear. Unsuccessful promotions should have 
little impact on retailer pricing behavior.  Lal and Matutes’ model (1994) implies that 
retail prices or markups should fall during the CAC’s promotion periods, given that the 
promotions are successful in increasing demand. In contrast, Warner and Barsky’s model 
                                                 
6 This hypothesis was proposed and tested for iceberg lettuce by Sexton and Zhang (1996) and subjected to 
further testing by SZC (2003) for iceberg lettuce and fresh tomatoes.   23 
(1995) does not predict that retailers reduce retail prices or margins as a result of the 
increase in avocado demand generated by the CAC’s promotions. On the other hand, 
evidence  of  higher  retail  markups  in  response  to  CAC  promotions  supports  a  simple 
market power model of retail pricing, whereby retailers increase prices and margins to 
capture benefits from the demand expansion. Notably the behavior described in Lal and 
Matutes’ model reinforces the effect of the CAC promotions, while behavior described 
by the simple market power model mitigates their effectiveness.  
In  reality,  retailers  usually  arrange  advertised  sales  before  the  acknowledged 
demand shocks. As commonly observed, store flyers that contain advertised sales are 
usually circulated a week before sales actually take place. For example, retailers learn 
from experience or perceive a higher consumption of avocados during certain periods or 
holidays.  Retailers,  according  to  Lal  and  Matutes  (1994),  will  lower  retail  prices  or 
markups correspondingly. Two implicit conditions are that (i) retailers are well informed 
about the demand shock, and (ii) retailers perceive the demand shock is positive. A lack 
of response in retail pricing to the demand shocks generated by the CAC’s promotions 
does not necessarily imply that retailers behave competitively. It might be caused by lack 
of  communication  between  the  industry  and  retailers  about  the  industry’s  advertising 
campaigns and the effectiveness of the advertising programs.  
We can also test whether the effects of the CAC’s promotion programs on retail 
prices and sales are different across markets by estimating the models separately to obtain 
the pooled promotion parameters across all of the CAC treated markets and the market-
specific promotion parameters in each of the treated markets. Differences among cities in 
the sales response to promotions may reflect different levels of intensity of promotion by   24 
the CAC, or it may reflect markets that, for whatever reason, are more or less susceptible 
to  avocado  promotions.  Such  information  can  be  valuable  to  CAC  in  tailoring  its 
programs. 
7  The Results 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the effects of the CAC’s promotion programs. 
The CAC’s radio and outdoor advertising campaigns were associated with significantly 
higher retail demands in the base model. The presence of the radio (outdoor) campaign in 
the treated market was associated on average with 7,058 (8,822) more units sold for each 
size of Hass avocados at a retail account in one week. Magazine advertising in Atlanta 
had a positive but mild and insignificant coefficient. Neither the radio, nor outdoor, nor 
magazine  campaigns  had  a  significant  impact  on  retail  price,  or  on  retail  markup  on 
average.  Retail  price  and  markup  were  lower  (higher)  during  the  radio  (outdoor) 
campaigns, but the effect was negligible and insignificant. Lower retail price and markup 
during the radio promotions may suggest that retailers responded more actively to the 
radio advertising than to the outdoor promotions. 
Market-specific promotion coefficients are also estimated for the CAC’s radio and 
outdoor  campaigns.  The  estimation  results  are  reported  in  Table  5.
7 Nine  of  the  ten 
selected markets were associated with higher retail sales during the radio promotions, and 
with three of them (San Francisco, Los Angeles and Dallas) had significantly higher sales. 
A test for equality of the sales responses to the radio campaigns is rejected at the 95 
percent level (
2
9 χ =17.08, ρ = 0.048). None of the three markets with significantly higher 
                                                 
7 Table 9 only reports coefficients related to the market-specific effects.  Coefficients for the other variables 
were little changed when the estimation model was expanded to include market-specific effects for the 
promotion variables.   25 
sales during the radio promotions were associated with significantly lower retail prices or 
markups.  Retail  prices  were  lower  in  five  out  of  ten  treated  markets,  but  only 
significantly lower in Atlanta, during the radio promotions. A test that the price responses 
to the radio promotions are jointly equal to zero in all treated markets is rejected at the 95 
percent level (
2
9 χ =19.95, ρ = 0.032). Radio promotions had no significant effects on retail 
markups in any of the treated markets. A test that the responses of retail margins to the 
radio  campaigns  are  jointly  equal  to  zeros  in  all  treated  markets  cannot  be  rejected 
(
2
9 χ =13.04, ρ = 0.221). 
The estimates of the market-specific responses to the CAC’s outdoor campaigns 
revealed a higher degree of heterogeneity than those to the radio campaigns. All of the 
three tests for equality of the responses in sales, retail prices, and retail markups to the 
outdoor promotions across the treated markets are rejected. Eight out of nine markets had 
higher  retail  sales  during  the  outdoor  promotions,  with  four  of  the  effects  being 
statistically significant. The CAC’s outdoor campaigns had the strongest sales effects in 
San Antonio, where retail prices and markups were also significantly lower during the 
outdoor campaigns. Notice that the radio campaigns also had the largest positive effects 
on sales, and negative effects on retail prices and retail markups in San Antonio, although 
none  of  them  are  statistically  significant.  Combined,  the  CAC’s  radio  and  outdoor 
campaigns had comparatively large effects on retail sales in San Antonio, San Francisco, 
and Los Angeles, and comparatively minor effects on retail sales in Portland and Atlanta. 
 Both radio and outdoor advertising programs were successful in promoting sales 
at the retail level in the selected markets. In general, both campaigns had little effect on 
retail prices and retail margins. On balance the evidence is mixed relative to the Lal and   26 
Matutes hypothesis that higher retail demands are associated with lower retail prices or 
retail  margins,  and  there  is  no  support  for  the market-power  hypothesis  that  retailers 
would  capture  benefits  of  demand-expanding  industry  promotions  through  charging 
higher prices. 
As noted, retailers usually make ex-ante pricing decision. Retailers, according to 
Lal and Matutes, reduce retail prices or retail markups only if they are well informed 
about the advertising campaigns, and/or they believe that the CAC’s radio and outdoor 
promotions will effectively increase avocado demand. Therefore, the CAC’s promotion 
programs could possibly be enhanced if the CAC improves communication with retailers 
about its advertising campaigns. 
Further,  we  calculate  the  average  benefit-cost  ratio  of  the  CAC’s  promotion 
program. First, we aggregate the demand shift at the retail level for each market and 
aggregate the demand shift for each week during promotion period on average to each 
year. Further, we convert the demand shift from units to pounds according to the size and 
packing information provided by the industry. We utilize the estimated price elasticity at 
the  farm-gate  level,  -1.33,  by  Carman  and  Craft  (1988)  as  a  starting  point  of  the 
preliminary analysis. The demand expansion is 3783604 pounds each year on average 
during 2002-2004 for the selected retail chains in the promotion markets. This demand 
expansion causes the farm-gate price to increase by 1.39% on average. Since we are 
waiting for the last set of data on the percentage of retail sales of selected retail chains in 
a certain market and the percentage of retail sales in selected market in a certain shipping 
area, we cannot draw the final conclusion on the benefit cost ratios.  
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Table 1: Estimation Results for Retail Sales Model 
 
Dependent variable  Retail Sales 
Constant  65.084*** 
  (13.183) 
Retail price   
Retail price (t)  -58.128*** 
  (14.175) 
Retail price (t-1)  -7.066 
  (9.649) 
   
Promotions   
Radio  7.058*** 
  (2.857) 
Outdoor  8.822*** 
  (3.376) 
Magazine  0.430 
  (2.076) 
   
R-squared  0.72 
Notes:  
1.  Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.  
2.  One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, 
respectively.   31 
 
Table 2: Estimation Results for Retail Pricing Model 
 
  Estimated Coefficient 
Constant  1.206*** 
  (0.110) 
Shipping point price   
Shipping point price (t)  0.136*** 
  (0.027) 
Shipping point price (t-1)  0.205*** 
  (0.027) 
   
Imports   
Mexican imports (t)  0.002 
  (0.002) 
Mexican imports (t-1)  -0.006*** 
  (0.002) 
Chilean imports (t)  -0.002** 
  (0.001) 
Chilean imports (t-1)  -0.003*** 
  (0.001) 
   
Promotions   
Radio  -0.007 
  (0.012) 
Outdoor  0.010 
  (0.014) 
Magazine  0.022 
  (0.032) 
   
R
2  0.69 
                                 Notes: The same as those listed in table 1.   32 
 
Table 3: Estimation Results for Farm-Retail Spread Model 
 
Dependent variable  The Farm-Retail Price Spread 
Constant  0.786*** 
  (0.091) 
Shipment volume  0.038*** 
  (0.009) 
   
Imports   
Mexican imports (t)  0.001 
  (0.002) 
Mexican imports (t-1)  -0.007*** 
  (0.002) 
Chilean imports (t)  -0.002 
  (0.001) 
Chilean imports (t-1)  -0.003** 
  (0.001) 
   
Promotions   
Radio  -0.005 
  (0.013) 
Outdoor  0.014 
  (0.014) 
Magazine  0.021 
  (0.032) 
   
R-squared  0.42 
                                 Notes: The same as those listed in table 1. 
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Table 4: Effects of the CAC’s Promotions 
 
  Retail Sales  Retail Price  Price Spread 
Radio  7.058***  -0.007  -0.005 
  (2.857)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
Outdoor  8.822***  0.010  0.014 
  (3.376)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Magazine  0.430  0.022  0.021 
  (2.076)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
                           Notes: The same as those listed in table 1. 
 
Table 5: Effects of the CAC’s Promotions at the Market Level 
 
    Radio      Outdoor   
  Retail Sales  Retail Price  Price Spread  Retail Sales  Retail Price  Price Spread 
San Francisco  13.362**  -0.033  -0.028  1.320  0.029  0.038 
  (5.522)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (5.841)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Los Angeles  7.920*  0.015  0.000  4.671  0.032*  0.025 
  (4.870)  (0.017)  (0.023)  (5.333)  (0.019)  (0.022) 
Denver  3.960  0.043  0.054  -4.254  0.072  0.081 
  (4.658)  (0.047)  (0.051)  (5.108)  (0.052)  (0.056) 
Phoenix  2.501  0.034*  0.032  4.739**  0.026  0.028 
  (1.934)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (2.153)  (0.020)  (0.023) 
Huston  5.481  -0.003  -0.003  7.722*  -0.031  -0.036 
  (3.985)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (4.567)  (0.019)  (0.020) 
Dallas  5.521**  0.017  0.026  3.168  -0.008  0.000 
  (2.234)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (2.365)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
San Antonio  29.811  -0.021  -0.021  144.079***  - 0.100***  -0.107*** 
  (36.112)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (39.823)  (0.033)  (0.032) 
Seattle  1.610  0.004  0.002  2.752**  0.030  0.025 
  (1.011)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (1.173)  (0.024)  (0.025) 
Portland  -1.395  -0.001  0.005  2.836  0.065**  0.070** 
  (1.456)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (1.761)  (0.030)  (0.032) 
Atlanta  0.606  -0.053**  -0.415       
  (1.856)  (0.028)  (0.029)       
             
Hypothesis Test 1             
H0: Promotion coefficients are equal across the treated markets.  
(d.f. = 10 for radio promotions; d.f. = 9 for outdoor promotions) 
Chi-squared  17.08  15.28  12.29  26  15.71  26.66 
p-value  (0.048)  (0.084)  (0.198)  (0.001)  (0.047)  (0.001) 
             
Hypothesis Test 2             
H0: Promotion coefficients are equal to zeros in all the treated markets. 
(d.f. = 9 for radio promotions; d.f. = 8 for outdoor promotions) 
Chi-squared  17.38  19.95  13.04  26.03  22.40  26.69 
p-value  (0.067)  (0.032)  (0.221)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.002) 
Notes: The same as those listed in table 1.   34 
Table 6: Base Values for Benefit-Cost Ratios (average values over 2002-2004) 
 
Variable  Base Values 
California production of avocados  363318812 pounds 
   
Total CAC promotion expenditure  $4,568,245 
Expenditure on radio promotions  $3,183,842 
Expenditure on outdoor promotions  $1,133,780 
Expenditure on magazine promotions  $256,623 
   
Price elasticity  -1.33
* 
* Note: Carman and Craft (1998). 
 